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rustling grasses and tree leaves; or this: sitting beside a bubbling brook in a forest glade; or this: strolling along a beach with the surf rhythmically crashing and the calls of sea birds punctuating the misty air. As these examples illustrate, sounds are an integral part of our experience of nature, and especially attractive sounds are part of what makes many natural settings especially desirable.
Although we seldom consciously think about the sounds that we hear in nature, there should be little doubt about their impact on our experience of nature. Nonetheless, they are almost never mentioned in theoretical discussions of nature aesthetics. The tradition of ignoring sound is, in fact, an old one in Western aesthetic thought, which has instead focussed on the visual. As Aquinas tells us, "The notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire by being seen or known."' In addition to the visual this enfranchises the intelligible as potentially beautiful. As for the audible-this is typically left out of consideration.
In this regard we've advanced little since Aquinas. Recent accounts of environmental aesthetics still assign sound no particular role or value worth mentioning.2 Nonetheless, in what might be called "applied" nature aesthetics, sound is a frequent consideration. For instance, worries about the intrusion of nonnatural sounds regularly come up in debates about protecting wilderness areas. To take one example, the current controversy over whether to allow outboard motors, snowmobiles, truck portages, and so forth, in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area of northern Minnesota turns in large part on the intrusiveness of these activities, especially the way sounds made by engines globally broadcast throughout the surrounding wilderness area.3 The same issue underlies current controversies about restricting tourist sightseeing flights over the Grand Canyon. Indeed, the original Wilderness Act of Congress of 1964 is formulated in language that stresses this concern. For it describes a wilderness as an area in which the "imprint of man's work [is] substantially unnoticeable" and which "has outstanding opportunities for solitude." Because sounds are a ubiquitous part of our world and because, as we shall see below, as hearers we tend to label and categorize the sounds we hear, the impact of human-generated sounds on the character of a region can dramatically affect whether it strikes us as a wilderness, as truly untrammeled nature.
The peculiar position of nature sounds in aesthetic theory can be accounted for, in part, by the fact that commonly we hear sounds only at a subliminal level. Yet "subliminal" is not the same as actually undetected. When sounds are not the right ones for a setting, we may notice. As the New York Times recently observed, an "eerie quiet" now blankets Yosemite as a result of the severe decline of frog and toad species: "Eighty years ago, the wilderness in and around Yosemite National Park was rife with the trilling, croaking songs of frogs and toads, but no longer."4 Even granting that the sounds of nature are very important to the aesthetics of nature, there are two puzzles-one obvious, one less so-concerning the aesthetics of nature sounds that need to be addressed before they can take their proper place in theoretical accounts of the aesthetics of nature. The obvious puzzle is this: How are we to understand their appreciation? Nature sounds are not like music, not intentionally produced to be appreciated as expressive or aesthetic objects. Nor are they regimented into units as in music to be appreciated in spatial and temporal separation from other sounds occurring simultaneously. They surround us, occurring at many levels and distances from us, with no beginning or end. Given such significant disanalogies with music, how should we approach their appreciation? At the least, we need to understand what the "objects" of sonic appreciation might be.
The less obvious puzzle will be the focus of this essay. It is the problem of accounting for the special value most of us ascribe to nature sounds over and against nonmusical artifactual sounds. ("Artifactual sounds" are all those sounds produced by human activity. Some of these sounds are intentionally produced to be heard, for example, the warning beeps of a backing vehicle; some are produced to be appreciated as sounds, for example, music; and some, the vast majority, are simply by-products of human activities, for example, the roar of a jet plane, the sound of feet running up and down a basketball court, and so on.) The puzzle deriving from the special value we ascribe to nature sounds can be brought out by noting sonic instances of the problem of indiscernible counterparts, the pivotal theoretical conundrum motivating the art theory of Arthur Danto. The problem of indiscernible counterparts in art theory is the problem of producing a theory of art that accounts for how there can be pairs of objects that on the surface seem to be identical or nearly so, but which are regarded in radically different ways. Danto focuses on examples of artworks, real and imaginary, that have indiscernible counterparts that are not artworks or are very different artworks.5
In a parallel way, we can easily note pairs of approximately similar sounds with very different effects on listeners, pairs of similar sounds-for instance, thunder vs. bombs-that are regarded and appreciated in very different ways. In such cases, two sets of sounds are roughly indistinguishable acoustically, yet most of us regard the sound events in entirely different ways. Moreover, there are many cases in which, although not indistinguishable, the properties of two sound events are quite similar in terms of time patterns, frequencies, and intensities, and yet we regard the man-made sounds as unattractive and the natural ones as attractive in context. Here are two examples.6 (1) Approaching a roaring cataract in the mountains, we hear sounds that are often very similar to those of a middledistance jet engine, yet the jet sound strikes us as unpleasant--even from a distance-whereas the cataract sound strikes us as majestically powerful. (2) If you listen from above the mouth of a mountain canyon with both a highway and a river running through it, the traffic noise from the highway is often indistinguishable from the sounds of rushing water running through the canyon. (At some times of the year rushing water will predominate, at other times traffic will.) Yet one sound-the sound of a rushing mountain creek-strikes most people as a highly pleasing sound that blends well with other sounds to be heard in the area, such as the sounds of birds, insects, and wind. The other sound-rushing traffic noise-strikes most listeners as an unpleasant intrusion.
Call the distinction that we commonly make between phenomenally similar sounds the "natural-sound distinction"; call the accompanying value judgments the "natural-sound preference." Clearly, this preference does not extend to a general preference for sounds of nature over sounds of music, that is, sounds intentionally produced to be appreciated as sound. But we do have an entrenched preference for sounds of nature over most sorts of artifactual sounds. Even Kant noted a preference for nature's sounds:
What do poets praise more highly than the nightingale's enchantingly beautiful song in a secluded thicket on a quiet summer evening in the soft light of the moon? And yet we have cases where some jovial innkeeper, unable to find such a songster, played a trick-received with greatest satisfaction [initially]-on the guests staying at his inn to enjoy the country air, by hiding in a bush a roguish youngster who (with a reed or rush in his mouth) knew how to copy that song in a way very similar to nature's. But as soon as one realizes that it is all deception, no one will long endure listening to this song that before he considered so charming; and that is how it is with the song of any bird. In order for us to be able to take a direct interest in the beautiful as such, it must be nature, or we must consider it so.7 Not only do we have a preference for nature's sounds over indiscernible counterpart artifactual sounds, but we also have a generally more favorable reaction to nature's sounds than we do to artifactual sounds as a class.8 For example, we frequently regard the pervasive sounds of urban life as "noise" but hardly ever apply that term to the sounds we hear in nature.
Our regard for the sounds of nature, not surprisingly, parallels the socalled thesis of "positive aesthetics," the position that all untouched parts of nature are beautiful or have positive aesthetic qualities.9 Nature's sounds are almost always good: the same sounds that on the basis of their description purely in phenomenal terms (i.e., purely in terms of the properties of the sounds considered apart from what they are sounds of) we would expect to regard as ugly-for example, the croaks of frogs, the guttural call of the Secretary bird, the howling of wolves, the nasal grunting of the osprey-may well strike us as beautiful or as having special and positive aesthetic qualities in their natural context. My goal in this essay is to account for this preference for nature's sounds.10 In section II, I will briefly address the preliminary issue of how to conceptualize the objects of appreciation. In section III, I will address the coherence of the distinction underlying the natural-sound preference. In section IV, I will offer an explanation of why we have the preference. I argue that this explanation provides an adequate justification of our habitual application of the preference in our aesthetic responses to nature sounds. In section V, I explore two problematic consequences of the explanation I have given for the preference.
II. Nature's Sounds: The Objects of Appreciation Since the objects of our aural attention in nature are not discrete and walled-off sound events (as in music), to characterize them we need to think, potentially at least, of the whole network of sounds that surround us. A useful starting point is the notion of a "soundscape," a term coined by R.
Murray Schafer to refer to "the sonic environment"11 (any sonic environment, not just a pure nature setting). This notion is somewhat ambiguous. It is certainly tied to a geographical or spatial environment: the inside of a train station, the tourist overlook at the Grand Canyon, Piazza San Marco, the water's edge at a point along the coast of Devon, and so forth. This environment might be particular (St. Peter's Square) or general (a forest in Maine).
Even so, the term "soundscape" can have two related but different referents: (a) the sounds to be met with in that particular (or particular type of) environment, or (b) the environment (space, landscape) in which the sounds are to be heard. Because "soundscape" is on the face of it analogous to "landscape," a term tied to a spatial location, I will use it to refer to the containing space of sounds, distinguishing it from the soundscape events that occur within the soundscape. The soundscape is the repository, and soundscape events are any set of sounds to be heard together in the soundscape over a given period of time.12 These could include either the total set of sounds or various subsets of sounds to be heard over a period of time. I also understand soundscape events to include the sounds within a given environment as they occur spatially and temporally.13
Over the course of a day, soundscapes in nature change their appearance dramatically as various species of birds, insects, other animals, and weather events either begin to make sounds or cease to make them. Birds and the daily cycle of their sounds have a much greater impact on a soundscape than they do on the visual appearance of the associated landscape.14 This is even more true of insects that go unseen, such as crickets and cicadas. Their stridulations create a complex sonic background for many soundscapes.
With these remarks as background, I now propose that the most appropriate objects for an aesthetics of nature sounds are soundscape events. The most significant alternative proposal would be to take the primary objects of appreciation to be the sounds of individual kinds of things: birds, crickets, wind, waterfalls, and so forth.15 We have a concept of what these individual kinds of things sound like and could consider the type-for instance, the song of the Curve-billed Thrasher-as an object of appreciation. (One might, for example, admire the trills and warbles typically produced by the Curve-billed Thrasher.) However, I propose to set aside aesthetic attention directed to a bird or frog song type abstracted from any particular environment and moment in time in which it might occur. I do so because directing attention at the sound type would be to ignore how nature in its actuality sounds, how that bird song sounds in its actual instances. When we hear any actual tokens of the sounds of animals or natural features of the landscape, we hear them as part of the overall ensemble of sounds in a soundscape. Our aesthetic response to nonmusical sounds comes from sounds as actually heard, including background sounds. A second reason for focusing on soundscape events rather than on sounds of kinds of things is that many sounds of nature, with the exception of animal calls and songs, are so variable that their instances cannot reasonably be amalgamated into one specific sound type. The sounds of ocean or rivers or weather events vary significantly from place to place, time to time, and with each instance. What waves sound like hitting the shore depends on the weather as well as on the structure and texture of the coast against which they are moving. This points not only to the variability and complexity of nature sounds, but also to the inadequacy of thinking of the sounds of nature along the lines of a catalogue of the sounds of individual kinds of thing. The natural-sound preference can now be formulated as a preference for soundscape events that are natural over those that are artifactual.
III. The Coherence of the Natural-Sound Preference
The simplest explanation for our preference for nature's sounds is that they are intrinsically more attractive. Isn't the distinction that we make just obvious phenomenally? Think of the difference between a chain saw and a lark! But is it true that in general in themselves the sounds of nature are simply intrinsically more attractive or beautiful? Are (nonmusical) man-made sounds necessarily unattractive and nature sounds necessarily attractive? I do not believe so. Consider a list of "endangered" sounds compiled by Schafer: "milk bottles, steam whistles, bicycle bells, horseshoes being tossed against a metal spike"-these man-made sounds are often attractive. Conversely, as we have already noted, many nature sounds are not considered in themselves intrinsically attractive, for example, a howling wolf, a magpie cackle, thunder, a honking goose, and the like. Yet, the same sounds heard in the context of other related soundscape sounds can contribute to enchanting overall sound events.
The distinction is thus quite puzzling considered from the perspective of the phenomenal view of hearing, that is, any view holding that what we hear is completely characterized by the properties of the sounds considered apart from what causes them. But is the phenomenal view right? Certainly, formalists in the classical-music tradition have long urged us to listen to music in this way, that is, to base our appreciation of a musical work solely on the phenomenal properties of its sounds and their structural relations without regard to their origins.
I believe that both formalists and phenomenalists have an inadequate account of the way we hear sounds. My hypothesis is that the natural-sound preference can be understood if we accept a different model of the way we in general hear things in the world, one based on the idea of causal or referential listening. We usually (not necessarily or always) hear a sound as the sound of something: a frog or a river or a magpie; as a chain saw or airplane or hammering or Bill speaking. We cannot understand our responses to the sounds of nature unless we incorporate this most natural mode of listening into our account of the way we hear these sounds. Now, formalists in musical aesthetics insist that this way of listening is not how we ought to listen to music.16 But this seems wrong even for music. For the most part, the causes of musical sounds are relevant to their appreciation. As Jerrold Levinson has argued, it makes a difference, in terms of its identity and aesthetic properties, just who composed a sequence of sounds, and in what context. This ought properly to affect how we hear the musical work-for example, whether to hear it as a parody or not, whether to hear it as exciting (in context) or not, and so on. More directly, knowing the proximate cause of musical sounds, just who and what is producing the sound, makes a difference. Again, Levinson has argued in particular that instrumentation is an essential feature of most classical musical works written in the last three hundred years. The expressive properties of a musical passage are often affected by knowing the cause. Levinson notes, for example, that the aesthetic qualities of the Hammerklavier Sonata depend in part on the strain that its sound structures impose on the sonic capabilities of the piano; if we are not hearing its sound structure as produced by a piano, then we are not sensing this strain, and our assessment of the aesthetic content is altered. The closing passages of the Hammerklavier are awesome in part because we seem to hear the piano bursting at the seams.... On a ten-octave electronic synthesizer those passages do not have that quality, and a hearing of them with knowledge of source is an aesthetically different experience.17
Malcolm Budd argues for a general view of perception that parallels the notion of referential hearing. He says that "it is a general truth that we are delighted or otherwise moved by states of affairs, processes, and so on under certain concepts or descriptions" (p. 211), and also that "your experience of an item is sensitive to what you experience it as, so that an experience of it under one description has a different phenomenology from that experience under an incompatible description" (p. 212). Budd's claim that one's very phenomenal experience is a function of the category under which something is perceived implies that, at best, the term "phenomenal view" is ambiguous. For how something sounds to us is a function of what we hear the sounds as. The type of phenomenal view that I claim is mistaken is the view that the phenomenology of hearing, were we to describe it strictly, would be limited to the characteristics of sounds considered in themselves apart from what they are taken to be sounds of. Now, it is sometimes possible to hear sounds this way (only as sounds as the acoustician might describe them), but such experience is unusual and, I would maintain, for most of us often impossible. The phenomenal view gets the phenomenology of hearing wrong, both for music and for nonmusical sounds.
IV. Value-Laden Listening
If my auditory experience of traffic is qualitatively different (because it is an experience of traffic) from my experience of a river (because it is an experience of a river), is that enough to dissolve the puzzle of our natural-sound preference? It might seem that it is not. Even granting Budd's claim that "the fact that we experience something as natural might be integral to the emotion we feel towards it" (p. 211), questions may still arise as to why we feel those positive emotions toward nature sounds and whether we are justified to so respond.
Robert Elliot suggests an account of the value of the natural that might explain the preference for the sounds of nature. Elliot proposes that the natural automatically functions to carry an evaluative dimension. In this respect it is like the beautiful: "To say that something is beautiful is, prima facie, to give a compelling reason for restoring it, protecting it, caring for it, and preserving it."18 So, if "natural" is the opposite of "artifactual" and if by this very contrast value is produced, then we would have a sort of explanation for the preference for nature's sounds. But why does the natural carry value with it? Is this just a matter of the conventional meaning of "natural"? Elliot also suggests that the fact that "nature has value is, so to speak, a brute value fact."19 Ultimately, this explanation may be the best we can do. However, Elliot's view appears most plausible when we think of nature as comprising unique objects (or species) and habitats, for instance, penguins, the saguaro cactus, and the Amazon river. It may seem just obvious that these natural objects are valuable. But the "brute value" view is less obvious in the case of indiscernible counterpart sounds, which involve comparing two sounds that have superficially similar sonic features.
We might attempt a more elaborate explanation based on another of Elliot's suggestions, namely, that "[t]he intrinsic value that wild nature exemplifies supervenes on other of its properties. Thus environmental ethicists have drawn attention, variously, to its beauty, diversity, richness, integrity, interconnectedness, variety, complexity, harmony, grandeur, intricacy and autonomy."20 But while many of these properties are value adding or value laden, most of these properties-for instance, diversity, variety, complexity, intricacy-could be ascribed to artifactual sounds as well as to nature sounds.21 Moreover, others-beauty, grandeur, richness, integrityappear simply to beg the question concerning why we have the naturalsound preference.
More promising is Bernard Williams's view that it is its very "otherness" that gives nature its value.22 As Elliot puts the view:
Wild nature is raw... in that it is relatively unshaped by, relatively unmarked by, human intentions and human designs. What we see in nature that impresses and moves us is something that is there independently of the actions of creatures of our kind.... When we view nature we do not find unordered chaos. We find patterns, dynamic relationships and processes, shapes that please us and inspire us, but these features are there independently of the actions of any creatures such as ourselves.23
This may appear to be another circular explanation if used to explain a preference for nature sounds over similar artifactual sounds. But it is not necessarily such-although it is certainly a negative explanation. It says that we find nature and natural things valuable just because they are not us or made by us. As long as we can supply negative (i.e., value-subtracting) content to what we are and do-at least for the case of artifactual sounds that are not products of intention or direct design-we can conclude that part at least of the value of nature's sounds is that they are not artifactual. But what is wrong with nonmusical artifactual sounds? Are they not rich, diverse, complex? Perhaps they are not harmonious? But can we specify a sense in which nature's sounds are harmonious, but artifactual sounds are not?24
Rather than pursue this question head-on, I propose to return to the point we saw in the previous section. In the case of music we saw that our experience is determined in part by our cognitive stance. There is at least the negative point that, in so far as we simply value nature (Elliot's point), we have good reason to find human-made sounds an intrusion on nature. I believe that there are also positive reasons. Consider such examples as icebergs breaking off glaciers or thunderstorms. Both processes produce powerful sounds like bombs detonating. We can see why, on the one hand, we disvalue the bomb sound. But why value the very similar nature sound? I propose that, being aware of its origin, we hear it as a powerful and richly complex sound, and one caused by processes that, in being natural, are regarded by many of us as both right (they naturally belong) and inevitable-two aspects of "natural." The rightness or appropriateness of nature's sounds may be part of what some might mean by nature's "interconnectedness" or "harmony." The sounds are made by creatures and processes that are themselves interconnected through evolutionary and geological processes. They are "'harmonious" in the sense that the things and processes making the sounds are harmoniously related to one another through their joint and interconnected evolution. This is the reason that we hear these sounds as belonging together.
Water provides endless instances of sounds that are created by the natural process of falling, as in falls and surf. (Compare the charm of winddriven chimes and aeolian harps.) And (Elliot's point again) we value those things that make the sounds: streams, rivers, and oceans-they are "right," and their sounds are "right." This explanation in terms of objects and processes accounts, I think, for the way that sounds of nature relate together to form compelling wholes, even though the component sounds are in themselves (that is, disregarding their origin) not attractive. The whole soundscape ensemble is regarded as right and also irresistible; this contrasts sharply with the often exciting willfulness of musical sounds and their sense of being imposed on and thus abstractable from a given soundscape. Just as important, soundscape events in nature don't just belong together. They also belong where they are, they belong to the land. We hear them as belonging to their environment in a way that music is not meant to. And also in a way that artifactual sounds never do. The sound of a jet plane over a jungle or canyon clearly does not fit, does not belong. But doesn't the same sound belong at the airport, at least? Yes, it does. But the airport itself isn't experienced as natural; fundamentally, it is an imposition on the landscape-it is something we have made-a very different sort of entity than the plains or marshes that surround it and that it displaces.
Turning back to the "otherness" strategy, can we also propose that another potentially important quality of these sounds is that they are beyond us (since they are not produced by intentional and understandable human activities)? Budd says of birdsong, for example, that you delight in the seemingly endless and effortless variety of a song thrush's song-variations in pitch, timbre, dynamics, rhythm and vocal attack, for example... [the] phrases succeed one another but never seem to reach a final goal, a final ending; instead, they continue for an indefinite time in a way that does not appear to be meaningful overall. In other words, you hear the song as an unpredictable, apparently random melange of phrases.27
In so far as this is not just an appeal to the negative point that the bird's song is heard as not controlled by human intentionality, it suggests that the sounds have an attraction precisely because they are not fully predictable and understandable by us. While this is, I think, an important characteristic of the way we hear nature's sounds, I am disinclined to think this adds a decisive element to our explanation of our preference for nature's sounds. The reason is that artifactual sounds, even though caused by human activities, are often beyond us in similar ways: we don't understand exactly how they are produced, they are unpredictable in any detail, they continue indefinitely and are not meaningful.28 You could, for example, substitute for birdsong in the above quote "the sound of a busy industrial port" or "the sounds of a car race," and the description would all be true except for the fact that we usually don't delight in the endless and unpredictable variety of the sounds!29
The explanation I have sketched, I suggest, adequately deals with the problem of justifying our natural-sound preference. This is because my spade turns at the same level as it does for musical sound. In each case we can see that because sounds are music or because they are the result of a natural process, and heard as such, they are heard, however unreflectively, as exemplifying certain further nonacoustic properties that we value, such as interconnected belonging. We need only add, as I have, that artifactual sounds lack the relevant properties to make our natural-sound preference coherent and plausible. Whether we value these further properties innately-because as creatures that have evolved in natural environments, we find our deepest sense of belonging in relation to nature sounds-or whether our valuing them is culturally determined, are questions for speculative biology30 and anthropology. The explanation for our valuing such qualities, whatever it might be, need not be insisted upon in order to find our preference reasonable. I do not believe that we can offer a deeper "justification" of our love of music than this explanation offers of our preference for nature's sounds. The philosophical problem is to understand whether the distinction we make between nature sounds and human-made sounds is arbitrary. We have seen that it is not. When we then connect the distinction with values that we have, we have done all we need to do to deal with the justification question. What was bothersome was to understand why and how we could make a sharp distinction between phenomenally similar sounds and apply a preference in such cases. Those One point to make is that we can and often do appreciate subsets of soundscape events, mentally setting them apart from others. We can appreciate a birdsong as it occurs in the city park, while ignoring the traffic in the distance.32 This capacity also allows us to appreciate soundscape events separately and additively, as perhaps we might appreciate a Bach cello suite played in the woods and also appreciate the birds singing at the same time, but not appreciate them as related to each other. But, a proponent of John Cagian nonjudgmentalness may say, can we not also appreciate both as related to each other? Well, do we ever appreciate them in this way? If there seems to be a barrier to holistic appreciation, it is because the reason for valuing nature's sounds appears to make them immiscible, so to speak, with artifactual sounds.33 Since one can occasionally appreciate nonmusical artifactual sounds, one option, as already noted, is simply to appreciate the ensemble additively, that is, as the unrelated addition of the component elements. Those who pay attention to artifactual sounds-so far a very small group--surely sometimes appreciate them in this way, that is, as the unrelated but simultaneous sounds of clinking milk bottles and chirping birds. However, it may be possible to appreciate a mixed ensemble on the basis of listening to the sounds in the acoustic phenomenal way. This abstractive acoustic way is capable of superficially relating mixed sounds together, but the price of this way of hearing is not regarding the sounds as the sounds of particular types of things. We step back and listen to the sounds in themselves.34
Neither of the two ways I have suggested as possible ways of listening to the totality of mixed soundscapes-additively (nonholistically) or phenomenally (holistically, but merely as acoustic sounds)-is ruled out by my explanation of the natural-sound preference. I have not said that one could not appreciate sounds differently from the way we customarily do, nor have I argued that our normal way of hearing is the right one in an absolute sense, independent of human psychology and values. I have argued only that it is in fact how we hear things and that the value-laden picture underlying this way of hearing is plausible and coherent. Until we cease valuing nature and experiencing it in the way that we do, we will continue to hear natural sounds as in a category of their own. 
John Andrew Fisher

Appreciating Natural Beauty as Natural
Scholars who write about natural beauty are fond of reminding us that nature must be appreciated as natural. By this they generally mean that the canons and categories of appreciation we normally use in taking the measure of beauty in man-made objects-especially artworks-are out of place in the world of natural things. After all, they argue, mountains, marmots, and monsoons are not intentional objects; their meaning is not measured against the purposes of any (mortal) creator. The aesthetic concepts we apply to paintings, plays, and poems, whose nature and value are tightly tied to the purposes organizing their creation, do not apply to them. Mountains just are what they are, the evolved products of ages-old geophysical forces predating and indifferent to human life. It is precisely because paintings of mountains, as opposed to mountains themselves, are products of human will that we can regard them as well or ill composed, belonging to this or that style, sentimental, idealized, ironic, morbid, and so on.
Clearly there is a great deal of merit in this view. It is no less foolish and distortive to look at a mountain landscape as though it really were a painting-faulting it or admiring it for its compositional balance, say-than it is
